1. Introduction

The South Korean (hereafter, Korea) government has admitted a large number of temporary less-skilled labor migrants through expansive migrant worker programs, such as the Employment Permit System (EPS) and the Visiting Employment System (VES) (Asis et al., 2019; Surak, 2018). Yet, the dynamics of a number of prevailing societal ideas that led to the particular immigration policies of the Korean “migration state” (Hollifield, 2004) have not been fully explored. The idea of the migration state, introduced by James Hollifield, has provided migration scholarship with a useful and systematic framework for explaining the political, economic, and social backgrounds of immigration (Boswell, 2007; Consterdine, 2017; Hampshire, 2013). Recently, this framework has been increasingly applied to analyze non-Western cases (Adamson et al., 2024; Chung et al., 2024). Nonetheless, studies of Korea’s immigration policy have predominantly characterized the country as a ‘non-migration state’, indicating a state that accepts very few migrants over time (for an exception to this view, see Lee, 2010). While these studies provide valuable insights, this paper aims to address two issues identified in the existing studies.

First, they often explain Korean immigration to be the product of a traditional and stereotypical perspective on Korean society. They tend to assume that Korea is a non- migration state, comparing it unfavorably with the more ‘open’ and ‘inclusive’ Western or ‘European-style’ (Seol and Skrentny, 2009a: 579) countries. Therefore, such studies naturally focus on ideas that are assumed to be unique to Korean society, such as ethnic nationalism (Lee et al., 2014; Seol and Skrentny, 2009b; Tsuda and Song 2019), and developmentalism (Chung, 2022a; Chung et al., 2024; Seol and Skrentny, 2009a; Tsuda, 2010; see also Kim, 2015: 742). However, other research points out that nationalism (Campbell, 2015; Kaufmann, 2017, 2019; Modood, 2019; Tinsley, 2019; Triandafyllidou, 2020) and developmentalism (Heo, 2015; Liow, 2011; Park et al., 2012) are not immutable ideas, but are dynamic and complex, evolving in response to real-world changes.

Second, previous studies tend to overlook the interaction between the various prevailing ideas that have shaped Korea’s immigration (policies), and the joint effect of these ideas over time (but as an exception to the complex effect of those ideas, see Lim et al., 2019). For example, instead of assuming a pure ethnic nationalism, we should consider that it coexists with civic nationalism. Similarly, developmentalism also interacts with political liberalism and neoliberalism. Considering how Korean society and Korean immigration policy have changed over the past 20 years, it is necessary to update the dynamic interaction and evolution of these ideas and their impact on immigration policy and its direction.

In light of these two lacunae, this paper begins by assuming that Korea is a ‘migration state’ (Hollifield, 2004), a concept that I will explain subsequently. Korea has consistently accepted migrants, although the numbers may be relatively modest in comparison to other countries, and this rate of acceptance of immigrants is steadily increasing.¹⁾ Thus, this paper explores Korean case through the lens of the migration state concept, arguing that it offers two advantages for understanding Korea’s situation: (1) this concept does not simply assume that the state linearly accepts immigrants, but provides a more systematic framework for explaining the various driving ideas or forces that have led the state to accept migrants while navigating potential conflicts with citizen discontent concerning the potential ‘dilution’ of an imagined Korean membership; (2) it adds a perspective of political and economic liberalism and the idea of ‘liberal paradox’ (Freeman and Kessler, 2008; Hampshire, 2013; Hollifield, 2004) to the Korean case, an aspect somewhat overlooked in previous studies (but for an exception, see Kim, 2008).

Moreover, this paper also seeks to expand the concept of the migration state by incorporating two additional dimensions that are relevant to the Korean case. Specifically, I argue that nationalism and neoliberal developmentalism must also be considered as ideas or forces within the Korean migration state, alongside the liberalistic dimension of the migration state. I argue that these three (liberalism, nationalism, neoliberal developmentalism), which I call the ‘three-axes’ of migration state, have often clashed, overlapped, and have found compromises with each other. This study examines how these dynamics shape the evolution of the ‘Korean migration state’, influencing major policy instruments such as the EPS and the VES, as well as minor yet impactful measures affecting migrants’ daily lives, such as visa categories, quotas, and industrial employment. This approach is inspired by studies that emphasize the importance of examining more fine-grained and prosaic effects (Lipsky, 1980[2010]; Painter, 2006).

This paper is divided into the following sections. I will first critically review the literature on the migration state as a foundational framework, focusing particularly on its relatively limited empirical basis. The next section is divided into two parts. In the first part, I will review the literature concerning the influence of nationalism and neoliberal developmentalism on Korean migration and its broader implications. I will then discuss literature that emphasizes the dynamic and evolving nature of these two ideas. In the fourth section, I will examine how these backgrounds shape policies for less-skilled migrant workers and the development of the Korean migration state by analyzing (state) archival documents.²⁾ Lastly, I will conclude with a brief summary of this study and suggestions for policy design as well as future research agendas for migration state literature.

2. The Liberal Migration State and its Geographical Limits

Many scholars have attempted to elucidate the complex politics of immigration (e.g., Boswell, 2007; Consterdine, 2017; Ellermann, 2021; Freeman and Kessler, 2008; Hampshire, 2013; Hollifield, 2004; Joppke, 1998). Central to these discussions is the concept of the migration state (Hollifield, 2004), which provides a systematic framework for comprehending the inherent dilemma faced by liberal states regarding immigration, as liberal economic forces push the state to accept more migrant workers, while certain civic nationalist forces prompt the state to close its national borders. This contradiction is known as the liberal paradox.

While there are some differences among various versions of this concept (see Hampshire, 2013; Joppke, 2005), it could be broadly described as follows: a liberal state confronts a dilemma because it requires additional labor to expand economic growth, whereas it encounters opposition from certain sections of the national citizenry who perceive migrants to be a potential threat that can destabilize social stability and the established ‘community’. Meanwhile, liberal states are also argued to adhere to domestic and international liberal standards (e.g., human rights and anti-discrimination) that support more inclusive policies because if the state rejects such standards, the state will damage its own legitimacy as a liberal state. Thus, the paradox reveals the multi-faceted nature of liberal states and the conflicts in various domains, encompassing political economy, institutions, law, national identity, and (global) ethics (see Hollifield and Foley, 2022). Building on these previous studies on the liberal migration state, this paper defines liberalism as a broad idea that encompasses economic liberalism, which emphasizes the market mechanism, free trade, and the free movement of people, especially of migrant workers in this paper’s context, and civic nationalism that underlines a national ‘community’ of citizens, potentially leading to the exclusion of migrants, and a political liberalism that highlights human rights and anti-discrimination.

While the idea of migration state as entailing a liberal paradox has primarily been employed to explain traditional Western migration states, more recent efforts have sought to extend its applicability to other global regions (e.g., Chung, 2022a; Chung et al., 2024; Frowd, 2020; Hollifield and Sharpe, 2017; Sadiq and Tsourapas, 2022). This expansion reflects the evolving landscape of global migration, or at least, the increasing complexity of global migration studies since the idea was first introduced. For example, while Hollifield (2004) once noted that “Japan, Taiwan and Korea … have only just begun to grapple with the problem of immigration, on a relatively small scale” (905), these countries have since opened their borders to immigrants over the past two decades, albeit to varying degrees. Consequently, they have emerged as the main destinations for migrants in East and Southeast Asia especially, and migration policies have become one of their top priorities (Asis et al., 2019; Surak, 2018).

Thus, there is a need to expand the concept of the ‘migration state’ to accommodate its broader applicability while preserving its conceptual strength. In doing so, I emphasize that the free-market mechanism and civic nationalism, both pivotal components of the liberal paradox, may wield less influence in less- or non-liberal countries, as others have suggested by problematizing the “liberal bias” (Adamson and Tsourapas, 2020). The liberal principle of free transnational movement across the national borders is often overshadowed, by for example, the logic of border control and migration management, led by national (political) interests and security (see Geiger and Pecoud, 2010). As noted above, there may also be illiberal countries that actively control or even severely limit the flow of migrants, such as less-liberal democracies and more-authoritarian regimes (Adamson and Tsourapas, 2020; Chung et al., 2024).

Meanwhile, a civic-national community based on the social contract of citizens, a crucial basis for the logic of closure in the liberal paradox (Hampshire, 2013; Hollifield, 2004), may also be unstable in different contexts. While some Western countries are often upheld as exemplars of civic-national communities, others may not have followed the same trajectories as their Western counterparts. These may differ in terms of the process of nation-building and the formation of civic-national communities based on social contracts (Sadiq and Tsourapas, 2022; Tinsley, 2019), despite the influence of the global political economy. Postcolonial countries, for instance, have followed distinct paths, and many of them experience discrepancies between their modern national territory and their membership, leading to conflicting histories of making liberal national communities. Additionally, studies highlight cases where ethnic-national communities significantly shape national membership (e.g., Shin, 2006; see also Tsuda, 2010), suggesting that a collective belief in an ethnic-national community could also be important for understanding the dynamics of the migration state.

These limitations raise questions about the applicability of the liberal paradox to countries beyond the ‘traditional’ ‘Western’ migration states. However, such questions do not necessarily diminish its relevance in Western or even Asian countries. Nonetheless, to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the evolution of Korea’s migration policies, we need to consider developmentalism and nationalism alongside liberalism.

3. Nationalism and Neoliberal Developmentalism in Shaping the Korean Migration State

Scholars have examined the impacts of nationalism (e.g., Samers and Rydgren, 2024) and developmentalism (e.g., Chung, 2022a; Chung et al., 2024) on incoming (less-skilled) migrants. In this paper, I define these concepts as follows: (1) Nationalism refers to a set of prevailing ideas that prioritizes a sense of membership based on either (imagined) co-ethnicity (ethnic nationalism) or citizenship (civic nationalism) over other political and socioeconomic groups. Thus, in this paper, liberalism intersects with civic nationalism, but not with ethnic nationalism. (2) Developmentalism refers to a form of national economic development that is mostly planned, implemented, and controlled by the state’s elite bureaucracies. However, I focus more on what Liow (2011) calls ‘neoliberal developmentalism’, drawing on discussions regarding the confluence of neoliberalism and developmentalism in East Asian countries (see also Lai and Samers, 2017; Park et al., 2012). As a hybrid of two sets of ideas, neoliberal developmentalism aims to enhance economic growth by relying on the globalized market mechanism, which is shared by economic liberalism. Yet at the same time, it emphasizes the state’s strong intervention and regulation to establish the more favorable institutional environment in pursuing this goal (Leitner and Miller, 2007; Peck, 2003). I suggest that a more nuanced integration of these concepts with the ‘migration state’ is warranted.

1) A mixture of ethnic and civic nationalism in the making of Korean immigration policies

Nationalism is frequently seen as an obstacle for immigrants who are often viewed as potential threats to societal cohesion and security (e.g., Green et al., 2011; Ko and Choi, 2022; Polynczuk-Alenius, 2021). In the Korean context, as noted by Brubaker and Kim (2011) and Shin (2006), the idea that ethnic-based nationhood is a fundamental principle of the Korean national community is broadly and traditionally accepted. Generally, the literature points out that entrenched ethnic nationalism in Korea has led to exclusionary and stratified policies regarding immigration and national belonging (Kim, 2008; Lee et al., 2014). Other scholars, who have focused more on co- ethnic immigration, have argued that ethnic nationalism’s role is (unexpectedly) minor in Korea, especially when contrasted with other countries, such as Germany and Japan, based on the diverse classification of Koreans (South Korean citizens, co-ethnic Koreans in richer countries, and Joseonjok/Goryeoin) (Seol and Skrentny, 2009b; Skrentny et al., 2007).

While these studies offer valuable insights to expand the liberal migration state concept, two important concerns emerge. Firstly, they often overlook the potential influence of civic nationalism because the pairing between ethnic nationalism and Korean society is rarely questioned and because the two nationalisms are often perceived to be dichotomous (e.g., Seol and Skrentny, 2009b; Tsuda, 2010). Considering that civic nationalism can lead to exclusionary immigration policies, these analyses may be limited by a narrow analytical lens, described by Kim (2016) as the binary of “instrumentalism and culturalism” (173). That is, different exclusive immigration policies can only be explained in two ways; either that the Korean state views migrant workers as a simple tool for the national socioeconomic interests (instrumentalism), or that the state prefers co-ethnic immigrants over non-co-ethnic immigrants (culturalism) (e.g., Seol and Skrentny, 2009a, b; Skrentny et al., 2007; Tsuda, 2010). Moreover, based on the binary of instrumentalism and culturalism, some scholars have even concluded that the Korean migration state exhibits a more goal-oriented and callous stance toward immigrants compared to Western counterparts’ humanitarian and even “romantic” approach to immigrants (e.g., Skrentny et al., 2007: 817).

Yet many studies of nations and nationalism have underscored the complex challenge of distinctly categorizing ethnic and civic forms of nationalism (Halikiopoulou and Vlandas, 2019; Joppke, 2005: 16-17; Tinsley, 2019), and Korea is also not exempt from this false dichotomy (Kalicki, 2009). This is evidenced by demonstrations against authoritarian regimes and the development of democracy, a refusal to grant automatic overseas suffrage (Kalicki, 2009), dual citizenship to overseas Koreans, and more recently, antagonism against Joseonjok³⁾ and increasing skepticism about unification with North Korea and the value of the agenda of ‘transnationalism’ (Campbell, 2015). It is therefore quite surprising that there has been a lack of scholarly attention to the potential for negative perceptions and policy decisions regarding immigrants that aim at preserving the so-called ‘integrity of the domestic citizen community’ and maintaining social stability based on civic nationalism.

Moreover, previous studies have not linked (ethnic) nationalism with other processes, resulting in a binary conclusion that nationalism’s impact on immigration policy’s direction is either existent or non-existent. Consequently, other potential ideologies’ impact on immigration policy, such as the mixture of developmentalism and liberalism, tend to be overshadowed. However, recent studies that underscore the hybridity and multifaceted nature of nationalism (Halikiopoulou and Vlandas, 2019; Modood, 2019; Samers and Rydgren, 2024; Tabachnik, 2019) treat nationalism as an ever-changing idea that interacts with the changes in the contemporary world (Halikiopoulou and Vlandas, 2019; Joppke, 2024; Modood, 2019; Samers and Rydgren, 2024; Tabachnik, 2019), as Triandafyllidou (2020) describes it as “interconnected, fluid, blurred, permeable, and liquid” (798-9). These studies suggest that Korean nationalism is not static and confined to traditional ethnic roots but is rather dynamic. As Shin (2006) noted, what he simply calls Korean nationalism is combined with developmentalism and globalization for the purposes of the nation’s development and survival. Hence, nationalism could be another realm in which the Korean migration state oscillates between the closure and openness to immigration, which should be examined alongside the effects of the liberal paradox, and this applies to developmentalism as well.

2) Neoliberal developmentalism in the making of Korean immigration policies

A group of studies have investigated whether developmental states facilitate or hinder immigration. Scholars have frequently compared ‘developmental’ East Asian states to ‘liberal democratic’ European and North American states (Bartram, 2000; Chung, 2022a; Seol and Skrentny, 2009a), with the argument that the former are more restrictive towards immigration than the latter. They propose that in East Asian developmental states, there exists an authoritarian state-led political system and decision- making process that controls less-skilled immigrants for economic growth and domestic order, and elite bureaucracies that stubbornly resist external changes, which serve as a major explanation for the lack of multicultural societies in East Asian countries. Chung (2022a), for instance, has also argued that East Asian countries, such as Taiwan, Korea, and Japan, maintain strict immigration policies, admitting only a select few immigrants despite labor shortages. This approach aims to establish a skill- based migration system that boosts economic growth while maintaining social stability and national security that are argued by the state to be achieved by restricting social rights. Nonetheless, other studies indicates that developmental states may indeed be more open to accepting immigrants. Lee (2019) has shown that Singapore, as a developmental state, has been actively seeking less-skilled immigrant labor to tackle labor shortages, while possessing the strong autonomy to control and even ignore pressure from public and economic stakeholders to accommodate these workers (see also Yeoh and Lam, 2024).

However, these studies have overlooked some critical aspects. Firstly, by overly emphasizing the developmental state, they have underestimated the political influence of liberalism. These studies highlight the authoritarian developmental states that implement immigration policies only for the purpose of economic growth and the state’s or bureaucrats’ autonomy and capacity, which effectively ignore the claims of liberal and more humanitarian immigration policies (e.g., increasing the social rights for immigrants). However, they fail to consider that many East Asian countries have transitioned to democracies and more diversified regimes in the last two decades.⁴⁾

For instance, the Korean government can no longer forcibly intervene in the migration of people in an authoritarian manner as it did during the authoritative regimes of the 1970s and 1980s. The Korean state is now constituted by more heterogeneous institutions, and thus, as I show later in this paper, the government must consider the conflicting stances of various state actors (e.g., the courts or judges) and even the voices of non-state actors. Moreover, while Chung (2022a) claims that East Asian countries prioritize economic growth above all else, this idea largely reflects the authoritarian regimes of the 1970s and 1980s, as well as studies before the 2000s (131-133). Given the rapid sociopolitical changes with the consolidation of democracy and the highly diversified social groups of contemporary Korean society, and the fact that policies for less-skilled migrants started after the 2000s, it is difficult to argue that the state still mobilizes the “population to pursue rapid economic growth while putting other priorities, most notably democracy, on hold” (Ibid.: 133, see also Woo-Cumings, 1994: 413-414).

Furthermore, recent studies on developmentalism, especially its intersection with neoliberalism (see Heo, 2015; Liow, 2011; Park et al., 2012; Thurbon, 2012), suggest that neglecting (economic) liberalism could pose potential problems in discussions about the Korean migration state. Developmental states can/do not remain in the same exclusive and hermetic position they held at the end of the 20th century, due to global neoliberal forces. Instead, they now employ neoliberal policies and practices to achieve national (developmental) goals. This is particularly relevant when discussing the relationship between developmental states and immigration today. The logic of neoliberalism can easily be used as a potential facilitator or legitimatization for accepting migrants, especially in situations where domestic labor shortages become apparent and appear to impact economic growth. This could also be important given that the launch of less-skilled immigration programs in Korea followed the country’s neoliberal turn during/after the financial crisis in the late 1990s.

Secondly, previous studies on the effects of developmentalism have often overlooked the continuous expansion of co-ethnic immigration since they are seen as simply ‘co-ethnics’ rather than as migrant workers. For instance, while Seol and Skrentny (2009a) argued that migrants’ settlement is rare in Korea due to restrictive settlement policies they did not adequately consider numerous cases of immigration and settlement of co-ethnic returned migrants. Similarly, Chung (2022a) suggests that Korea maintains less liberal migration policies due to its commitment to an exclusive and hierarchical “developmental citizenship” (131), instead of liberal principles. However, it is difficult to deny that co-ethnic immigrants constitute the largest portion of less-skilled migrant workers, and since the 2000s, the opportunities for them to have fuller membership have significantly expanded, as discussed below. Moreover, negative attitudes among some Korean-born citizens towards co-ethnic immigrants indicate that co-ethnic immigration has not been seamless.

In sum, nationalism and neoliberal developmentalism are potentially important prevailing ideas that have influenced Korea’s immigration policies, but they should not be considered in isolation. Instead, I argue that these, along with liberalism, constitute three ideational axes of Korea’s immigration policies. In the subsequent chapter, I will analyze how liberalism, nationalism, and neoliberal developmentalism have intertwined to carve out the Korean migration state.

4. The Three Axes and the Expansion of Immigration: An Empirical Demonstration

In this section, I will examine Korea’s evolution into a migration state, characterized by its gradual expansion of immigrant inflows, especially less-skilled workers, by examining several important policies. I will focus on the increase of non-co-ethnic and co-ethnic immigrants, respectively, and the interaction and contestation between the different ideas that have led the increase within the ‘three axes framework.’ This included the implementation and (gradual) expansion of the EPS through the changes in the annual quota of all immigrants allowed into Korea, changes in the industrial sectors that were allowed to employ immigrants, and changes in the legal status of co-ethnic migrant workers.

1) Political oscillation, but gradual expansion of accepting non-Korean migrant workers

The EPS was designed not simply to accept migrant workers, but to recruit them into specific sectors, as is the case with many other countries such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Taiwan. In Korea, the EPS tackled its labor shortage problem in the manufacturing and agricultural/fishery industry through less-skilled temporary migrant workers. Under these programs, the Korean government has accepted less-skilled migrant workers from various Asian countries on a temporary and rotational basis. While researchers have already examined the transition from the ITTP to the EPS (e.g. Chung, 2022b; Surak, 2018), it is still worth investigating the interplay between the logic of closure and openness, particularly given the increasing recruitment of migrant workers and the opening of more and more sectors to migration over roughly the last two decades.

During the late 1990s and early 2000s, the proposed shift from the ITTP to a larger-scale official program for less- skilled migrant workers (EPS) sparked significant opposition. Both civic and ethnic nationalism fueled concerns about societal destabilization and the infringement upon Korean citizens’ jobs. For example, some government departments argue that the “greatest side effect [of introducing the EPS] is social instability” and cautioned that if many less-skilled migrant workers immigrate, they will “demand equal treatment as nationals, constant improvement of working conditions, and this could lead to xenophobia and seriously bad situations” (Archival document from the Ministry of SMEs and Startups (MoSS) 2002⁵⁾; see also Hankyoreh, 1995). This claim was combined with business owners’ opposition to the EPS, who were also concerned that if the government facilitated the recruitment of migrant workers, then the social stability of Korean society would be threatened. For example, some business owners labeled the EPS as “a bad policy that will destroy the protection of middle-class and lower-class Korean citizens” and argued that “the plan for the EPS by the government is against the global trend of controlling labor immigration, especially in developed [sic] countries” (Archival document from the MoSS 2002⁶⁾). They also argued that the EPS, as a state-led migration program, would complicate the process of employing migrant workers and increase their costs because EPS demands more requirements regarding recruitment processes and migrant workers’ rights. Thus, they continuously expressed and attempted to influence the EPS design process by framing migrant workers as potential “threats” to the domestic community, citing concerns about social stability and economic disadvantages (Archival document from the Korea Federation of SMEs 2000⁷⁾; see also DongA-Ilbo, 1997; Hankyoreh, 1995).

Nonetheless, the forces against accepting more (non-co-ethnic) migrant workers through the EPS were (partly) overcome in the debate during the late 1990s and the early 2000s, basically by the logic of a ‘neoliberal developmental’ solution aimed at addressing labor shortages by importing migrants and connecting it to what the government considered to be the ‘urgent national task’ for further development. Government officers involved in bureaus introducing the EPS, such as the Ministry of (Employment and) Labor (MoEL) and the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), viewed migrant workers as ‘manpower’ [sic] and emphasized the importance of ‘supplying’ them to businesses through the introduction of a transnational migration system (Archival document from the Ministry of Construction and Transportation (MoCT) 2005⁸⁾). Another document from the MoCT, for instance, noted that “issues of the labor shortage in small and medium-sized businesses should not be continued … [because] it will seriously affect the credibility of the businesses and Korea in global market in negative ways” (Archival document from the MoCT 2002⁹⁾). That is, a state-mediated, and labor market- oriented migration policy has been in place with the specific goal of economic development (Archival document from the MoEL 1996¹⁰⁾), given the rapidly dropping fertility rate (KOSIS) and because the pool of rural and/or female workers has been exhausted (Chung, 2022a). Furthermore, ‘importing’ more migrant workers was not only a simple state intervention to support small and medium- sized enterprises (SMEs), but also a project to protect national credibility in the global economy given the relationship between declining demographic growth and the labor market in Korea. (Archival document from the MoCT 2002¹¹⁾).

The EPS was also supported by pro-migrant NGOs, religious groups, and academic circles, which advocated for the protection of migrants’ social rights from a politically liberal standpoint. Their influence was clear in shaping the EPS policy framework. According to governmental reports, pastors, professors, and civic activists upheld the EPS against the businesses that held a negative stance towards it, and the pressure from certain segments of civil society was seriously considered by the government at that time (e.g., Archival document from the MoJ 2005¹²⁾; see also Chosun Ilbo, 1997). This civil society pressure played a crucial role in the adoption of the EPS (see Chung, 2022a; Surak, 2018). It is also revealed in a report from the MoSS written in opposition to the introduction of the EPS, that “human rights and pro-migrant NGOs and religious groups are vociferous groups that continuously demand the enhancement of human rights for migrant workers, not only concerning the introduction of the EPS but also thereafter” (Archival document from the MoSS 2002¹³⁾). In addition to pressure from civil rights groups, a policy report from the Office for Government Policy Coordination (2002) highlights concerns about the “(potential) deterioration of Korea’s national reputation as a country that does not violate human rights across Southeast Asian countries’ due to frequent violations of migrant workers’ human rights from Southeast Asian countries in domestic industrial workplaces [under the ITTP]”. Thus, as an important national policy task, it ‘should be solved by the state’ to maintain Korea’s reputation as an advanced and developed country committed to human rights. These diverse forces that impacted the government indicate that the government does not have operate in isolation from non-state actors in making policies, unlike what previous studies assume about the autonomy of the developmental migration state.

As such, the entanglement of neoliberal developmentalism, civic nationalism, and political liberalism has shaped the EPS to accommodate migrant workers while imposing specific constraints on their employment activities. Firstly, ‘small and medium-sized enterprises’ (SMEs) are permitted to employ migrant workers, but only if they fail to recruit domestic workers after 14 days, and the sectors in which SMEs are permitted to recruit and employ migrant workers is limited to less-skilled manufacturing, construction, agriculture/fisheries, and some service industries. The number of migrant workers should not exceed 50% of their Korean counterparts, signaling the objective of welcoming migrant workers as a response to labor shortages in industrial sectors in which Korean workers apparently no longer wished to work and to protect the Korean workers remaining in those sectors. Additionally, the number of migrant workers is controlled by disallowing EPS migrant workers to stay in Korea for more than 4 years and 10 months in a row, which prevents them from applying for permanent residency (which requires continuous residence of over 5 years).

However, despite these barriers to work and settlement, there has been increasing neoliberal developmental pressure to address concerns about the potential economic decline that might ensue from slowing demographic growth among the working-age population (see Figure 1), which has led to a chronic shortage of workers in less- skilled fields. Consequently, the government has sought to focus on accepting more migrant workers, despite the sociopolitical concerns noted above. On the one hand, the government recognizes the issues within the domestic labor market, social instability, and citizens’ complaints about increasing the number of migrant workers, as highlighted in the Basic Plans for Foreigners’ Policy. On the other hand, these issues remain as policy tasks to be handled and adjusted, rather than complete obstacles to accepting more migrants, including less-skilled migrants. The reason behind this lies in the sense of crisis about the decline in GDP growth and the available labor pool, given the decreasing working population (Immigration Office 2013: 19). Furthermore, concerns about population decrease have recently combined with a nationalistic discourse about both a ‘Korean (ethnic) extinction’ (see Jo, 2016; KBS, 2015; Wall Street Journal, 2014) and the ‘extinction of rural areas’ (see Ma, 2017). These concerns have further reinforced the need to accept less-skilled migrant workers and to remove existing barriers for their activities, especially since the ‘extinction’ has occurred more rapidly in rural areas (KOSIS 2022b).

Figure 1.

Annual changes in the fertility rate of Korea, 1995-2023 (Unit: live births per woman, Source: KOSIS)

Consequently, regulations have been gradually removed and/or relaxed over time. For example, the rule that prohibited hiring more than 50% of domestic workers was abolished in 2005. Subsequently, in 2006, the number of migrant workers that companies with fewer than 300 employees could employ was increased by 20% of the total number of workers in a given company. From 2015 to 2021, different industries¹⁴⁾ were allowed to hire more migrant workers. In 2022, students from EPS participant countries were allowed to work as migrant workers after graduation. The expansion of quotas and industrial coverage also involved lifting regional restrictions that were established to consider - essentially avoid - competition with domestic workers. In 2011, the manufacturing industry in areas with populations under 200,000, including the Seoul Metropolitan Area (which was previously excluded from hiring migrant workers) was allowed to hire migrant workers, and after that, they were allowed to recruit an additional 20% migrant workers of the total number of workers in a given company. Finally, the government recently decided to remove the 4-years- and-10-months rule in 2022 for medium-skilled migrant workers, allowing them to stay in Korea for up to 10 consecutive years (MoEL, 2022). This decision is particularly radical given that the 4-years-and-10-months rule was initially created to prevent migrant workers from reaching the residency requirements for Korean citizenship and permanent residency.

2) The slow integration of two tracks of legal status of co-ethnic Koreans

As scholars have already noted, the politics of the migration of less-skilled overseas Korean immigrants are even more complex, given their dual identity as Koreans and as less-skilled workers (Kim, 2008). Here I aim to once again demonstrate the intersecting ideas of civic and ethnic nationalism as well as neoliberal developmentalism in the political contestation surrounding this migration. As this paper focuses on less-skilled migrant workers, some may assume that this section should focus solely on immigration programs such as the VES and H-2 visas for co-ethnic less-skilled migrant workers. However, I contend that the discussion should also include the F-4 visa for a broader overseas Koreans, as H-2 and F-4 (see Table 1) have been gradually converging. I propose that the process of this convergence reflects the complex expansion of Korean immigration policy and the multifaceted forces behind it.

The complex relationship between H-2 and F-4 stems from a pivotal 2001 Constitutional Court ruling, which found that the pre-1948 law regulating co-ethnic Koreans in poorer countries violated principles of equality and seriously infringed upon their rights. This ruling, rooted in prevailing ethnic nationalism, compelled the F-4 visa - previously limited to co-ethnic Koreans from wealthier countries - to include co-ethnic populations from poorer countries, notably China and former Soviet Union countries. According to the decision, excluding overseas Koreans in poorer countries from the F-4 visa is “legal discrimination against Dongpo (co-ethnic Koreans)”, which I argue, suggests a strong ethnic nationalism. Given that the F-4 visa grants virtually the same rights as existing Korean citizens, this decision meant a faster and larger immigration of co-ethnic people from poorer countries (or visa status changes of co-ethnic migrants who were already in Korea) for better socioeconomic opportunities (see Figure 2).

Figure 2.

The number of F-4 visa (Overseas Koreans) holders in Korea, 2009 – 2023 (Unit: number of person, Soource: KOSIS)

However, simultaneously, the influx of Dongpos from poorer countries, although they were considered to be the ‘same’ ethnic group, posed a significant dilemma for the government. The government had to address and manage not only issues such as labor market instability and the so-called ‘stress’ on the social welfare system (e.g., the regulation of the coverage of National Insurance for non-citizens due to the financial pressure on the insurance system) but also the general negative sentiments among existing Korean-born citizens towards the increasing number of ‘foreigners’. For instance, mainstream and social media argued that the majority of these prospective immigrants, mainly Korean-Chinese, were displacing domestic workers, especially in less-skilled labor positions, since the mid-2000s and late 2000s (DongA-Ilbo, 2018; Maeil Gyeongje, 2009). Furthermore, anger grew against the negative portrayals of Korean-Chinese residents and their supposedly ‘different’ cultural practices within Korean-Chinese enclaves, for example, in popular films (e.g., ‘The Outlaws’ and ‘Midnight Runners’). This anger highlighted tensions arising from civic nationalism among Korean-born individual,s who have regarded Korean- Chinese (including naturalized residents) simply as ‘foreigners’, despite shared ethnic roots. Nonetheless, the government could not ignore the need to provide additional workers for the labor market, and therefore the MoJ argued that the immigration program for co-ethnic workers should be continued (MoJ, 2001). These opposing or conflicting perspectives are observed in various government documents (Archival document from the MoEL 2005a, b¹⁵⁾; from the MoJ 1999¹⁶⁾, 2001¹⁷⁾). For example, the MoJ viewed them as co-ethnic people and favored treating them like existing Korean citizens as much as possible, whereas the Mo(E)L has essentially regarded them as non-co-ethnic foreign workers.

As a result, the government devised several legal and administrative measures to manage the influx of co-ethnic less-skilled migrant workers. These aimed to make a balance between adhering to the Constitutional Court’s ethnic-nationalist decision in 2001 and addressing the need for a sufficient workforce, while also mitigating social instability and negative sentiments among native Korean citizens. Firstly, the government established the H-2 visa category only for the VES co-ethnic migrant workers, which is a “hybrid … of a temporary employment-based visa system … and of a kinship/ethnicity-based visa system” (Lee and Chien, 2017: 2199). As VES is a part of the EPS program, H-2 visa holders are limited to work in less-skilled jobs. Secondly, the government emphasized again that F-4 visa holders should not work in less-skilled jobs by requiring them to submit documents that showed they were not in less-skilled sectors. Thirdly, and more importantly, this hybrid visa system represents a dilemma, making a two-track system of H-2 and F-4 for co-ethnic Koreans. While the H-2 category represents a significant enhancement for co-ethnic less-skilled migrants because it guarantees freer and more stable working conditions and legal status¹⁸⁾ (Surak, 2018), again, they cannot stay in Korea for more than 4 years and 10 months as they are considered temporary less-skilled migrant workers, similar to EPS workers. In addition, because of their basic position as migrant workers, they did not have any socioeconomic rights that F-4 visa holders have, for example, the rights of property ownership.

These hurdles, however, had to be temporary due to the Constitutional Court’s decision above. Therefore, the government initially defined the H-2 as a “preliminary step to granting overseas Korean residence status (F-4) to compatriots residing in China and the former Soviet Union” (MoJ, 2007, emphasis added), indicating that H-2 would eventually merge into F-4. In this transition, two important issues were considered: (1) possible labor shortages in less-skilled industries when H-2 migrant workers become F-4 visa holders, as the latter are not permitted to work in less-skilled industries in principle, and (2) potential social unrest and growing negative sentiments among native Korean citizens towards co-ethnic migrants formerly on H-2 visas, given that F-4 visa holders possess nearly identical legal status and rights as Korean citizens. As a result, the lines between these visa categories have been carefully and slowly blurred, especially in two ways.

Firstly, the ‘less-skilled’ industries have been continuously redefined (Lee and Chien, 2017), effectively permitting both H-2 and F-4 visa holders to work in various industries that were previously classified as less-skilled or medium-skilled. For example, H-2 visa holders gained eligibility to work in construction waste disposal in 2008, salt harvesting and hotel businesses in 2011, other construction industries in 2020, mining and logistics in 2021 (such as parcel loading and unloading work), air and ground cargo transport in 2022, and household services in 2023. On the other hand, F-4 visa holders were permitted to work in less-skilled industries in nursing, household care and childcare, agriculture and fishing, and manufacturing (such as defective product identification) in 2010, and additional simple tasks in manufacturing, agriculture, and fishing in 2015. Consequently, distinguishing between the industries for H-2 and F-4 visa holders has become challenging, particularly in the workplace, leading to many co-ethnic migrant workers working across various industries that demand more workers regardless of their visa types.

Secondly, H-2 visa holders are required to prove their qualifications when they change their visa to F-4. For example, the F-4 have been opened to H-2 visa holders who earned national industrial and technical certifications (2012), worked in ‘core’ industries (or what are called in Korean, ‘root industries’) for over two years (2018), graduated from local high schools or completed level-4 of the KIIP (2019)¹⁹⁾, and acquired national construction industry certifications (2020). These pathways, influenced by neoliberal developmentalism and civic nationalism, require co-ethnic migrant workers to contribute to Korea’s economic development as qualified workers and/or to its social stability and cohesion as ‘good’ members. Figure 3 provides a summary of the gradual expansion of less- skilled migrant workers in Korea.

Figure 3.

Summary of gradual expansion of immigration of less-skilled migrant workers in Korea

5. Conclusions

While the concept of the liberal migration state provides a useful framework for understanding the Korean context, it needs to be expand to include nationalism and neoliberal developmentalism. By employing the three-axes framework - liberalism, nationalism, and neoliberal developmentalism - this paper offers a nuanced explanation for the growth in immigration of less-skilled workers, encompassing both co-ethnic and non-co-ethnic immigrants, over the past two decades. The expansion of immigration has not unfolded smoothly; rather, it has been filled with bumpy interactions and contestation among different ideological forces. In Figure 4, I outline the interplay between these three axes and less-skilled labor migration policies. What I have called ‘ideas’ overlap, and specific policies influenced by them are assigned to each section.

Figure 4.

Interactions and positions of ideas and the resultant immigration policies
Note1: Blue means increase of immigration and red means decrease of immigration.
Note2: 1, 2, 3, 4 indicate the dynamics of immigration of non-co-ethnic migrant workers. Here are the details of each number: ① Introduction and implementing the EPS ② Support for the EPS from pro-migrants NGOs, religious and academic communities ③ Opposition to the introduction of the EPS ④ Expansion of the EPS based on national economic concern coming from population crisis and the discourse of ‘Korean extinction’.
Note3: 5, 6, 7, 8 indicate the dynamics of immigration of co-ethnic migrant workers. Here are the details of each number: ⑤ The decision of Constitutional Court concerning F-4 visas ⑥ Distinction between F-4 and H-2 making barriers for H-2 visa holders ⑦ Favorable working conditions for H-2 visa holders ⑧ Convergence of F-4 and H-2.

This paper concludes with a further discussion on the dynamics of East Asian and global migration states, responding to the recent call for diversifying studies of migration states (Adamson et al., 2024; see also Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, special issue “Rethinking the Migration State”, 50(3), 2024). The three-axes framework offers a nuanced explanation of the complexities within and across these migration states, advancing the idea of ‘disaggregating migration state’. As Adamson et al.(2024) insightfully noted, understanding the sociopolitical and economic contexts of each migration state is more critical than merely categorizing them into predefined groups. For instance, a group of scholars compellingly argued that “citizenship regimes are key to understanding migration regimes” (Chung et al., 2024: 25) by analyzing the principles and historical origins of citizenship regimes in East Asian countries. They emphasize the importance of considering the specific policies of each migration state, rather than reductively classifying them as ‘non-liberal’ or ‘liberal’ based on an East-West binary.

Nonetheless, I propose that we place greater emphasis on recent real-world changes as part of our ongoing project on historical and geographical comparative migration state studies. As discussed in the context of nationalism and neoliberal developmentalism above, this includes examining the development of democracy in East Asian countries, sociocultural shifts due to liberalization and globalization, and the resultant (potential) changes in national identities. A group of scholars tends to define East Asian countries as development states, asserting that they have “historically prioritized economic development, social stability, and national security over political and civil rights” (Chung et al., 2024: 26; see also Chung, 2022a). While these countries may have historically followed a developmental path, they have also rapidly embraced democracy and globalization, especially since the mid- 2000s when they began accepting large-scale migrants. Thus, it is now difficult to argue that East Asian countries solely prioritize economic and security benefits and social stability, as conventional understandings of East Asian developmental states suggest. The sociopolitical rights of diverse social groups, adherence to international humanitarian protocols, and pressure from civil society are also potentially significant forces influencing the migration regimes in these countries. Therefore, it is crucial to ‘de- essentialize’ migration states and continuously trace how these recent (and future) real-world sociopolitical and economic changes shape East Asian migration states.

The imperative to de-essentialize migration states is equally pertinent to broader migration state studies. While many studies have sought to diversify the understanding of migration states, a pervasive assumption persists that Western migration states are inherently ‘liberal’. However, research in geography, border studies, and refugee studies indicates that migration management and control systems globally are converging. Many Western countries with these systems increasingly aim to accept ‘desired’ migrants for economic and security purposes while restricting migrants’ rights in ways that are undemocratic or inhumane, features identified by Chung et al.(2024) as characteristic of developmental migration states. Moreover, the rise of far-right political movements, exclusionary policies against migrants, and evolving dynamics of nationalism underscore the challenges of categorizing migration states within traditional frameworks. Therefore, a crucial future task in migration state literature will be to de-essentialize and disaggregate each migration state, moving more radically beyond conventional and hypothetical categorizations of ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’.

Lastly, this paper offers two policy insights for the context of Korean society. First, migration policies for less-skilled workers (and broader migration policies) are often framed as either ‘unfavorable’ or ‘favorable’ towards migrants, particularly in the context of increasing political polarization surrounding migration issues these days. The former approach is frequently criticized by groups advocating for humanitarian perspectives on migration, while the latter is often challenged by those emphasizing practical concerns. However, such binary and polarized frameworks can hinder a nuanced understanding of migration policies, especially given the inherently complex and multifaceted nature of their evolution, as discussed in this paper.

Migration policies are not merely about answering straightforward questions, such as whether or how many migrants to admit. They also require a deeper understanding of the intricate characteristics of Korean society as a receiving country. Thus, developing and discussing migration policies necessitate an examination of the diverse and shifting socio-political contexts within Korean society. For instance, it is crucial to consider the public’s conception of the national community and the changing politico- economic dynamics shaped by neoliberal developmentalism. Moreover, if additional dimensions emerge as central and to understanding Korean society, or if the established frameworks proposed in this paper lose relevance, it is essential to adapt swiftly to reflect real- world changes. In this regard, the concept of migration state underscores the importance of adaptability, flexibility, and an embedded approach that remaind grounded in an up-to-date analysis of Korean society.

Second, it is crucial to recognize that migration policies are implemented through specific, often prosaic, policy practices (see Lipsky, 1980[2010]; Painter, 2006). As discussed in Chapter 4, contemporary migration policies for less-skilled migrants and their directions are shaped not by overarching policy frameworks but by lower-level practices. These include the industrial sectors open to less-skilled migrant workers, the regions permitted for EPS employment, and the categorization of visa types. Such lower-level policies are actively reshaping the characteristics of major migration policies, including the EPS, VES, and Overseas Korean visas. Therefore, policy makers, practitioners, and researchers must pay closer attention to the everyday and practical aspects of migration policies.